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When given a multiple-choice test over unfamiliar material, students may score
significantly above chance levels. This performance may be explained by prior knowledge of the
material or by “test-wiseness,” determining the correct answer by using cues present in the test.
Participants answered questions from an introductory psychology test-bank in two formats: a
question stem with a single alternative and a traditional four alternative multiple-choice,
reporting what sources of information they used to answer each question. For the singlealternative condition, participants had an accuracy of 42.2%, 17.2% higher than the base chance
of 25%, with an average accuracy of 40.75% for the multiple-choice condition. Participants who
stated they had previously learnt the material showed no significant difference in accuracy than
those who stated they had guessed. These findings suggest that tests may have inflated scores
which reflect test-wiseness and prior knowledge more than formal learning of the test materials.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Multiple-Choice Tests
When it comes to evaluating learning in formal education, the most common testing
method used is the multiple-choice test, or MCT. A survey by DiBattista and Kurzawa (2011)
found that over half of the undergraduate courses sampled used multiple-choice items in tests,
with more frequent use in larger classes (with over 95 students enrolled) and in first- and secondyear courses. Research also shows MCTs remain a key assessment method in post-secondary
education, even as other assessment methods are used (Mavis, Cole & Hoppe, 2001), with
additional research examining the implications of their continued use in professional contexts
(Bailey, Mossey, Moroso, Cloutier & Love, 2012).
This widespread adoption of MCTs may lie with advantages of the format. Bacon’s
(2013) examination of learning outcomes showed that carefully designed MC questions,
previously selected and revised based on psychometric properties, took less student time than
essays but with equal levels of reliability and validity. Similarly, grading MCTs can take less
time through using standardized materials and specialized machines, an appealing advantage for
large classes. The objective nature of grading these MC items allows for a perceived lessening in
bias, preventing the possibility of a student receiving markedly different grades for their work
depending on the reader of the work, such as in Ashburn’s (1938) examinations of essay
questions. These advantages (among others) encourage support for MC items among students
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and instructors, but MC items may have difficulty tapping into higher, application-based
knowledge levels (Simkin & Kuechler, 2005).
Another criticism of MCTs derives from the difficulty of constructing items. For
example, ambiguous wording of items and their alternatives can further disadvantage students
with verbal difficulties (Paxton, 2000). Proper construction of MC items is necessary for proper
evaluation of student knowledge. Although texts discussing test theory and item construction are
available, surveys of college faculty members indicated that many were unfamiliar with
construction procedures, tools, and terms (McDougall, 1997). Examinations of MC items used
by faculty (DiBattista & Kurzawa, 2011) found that while one-third showed good discriminatory
power, double that amount showed values of .20 or less, failing to meet the benchmark and
indicating poor test reliability.
Choosing the Correct Answer
In answering multiple choice questions, students are not simply restricted to a binary
outcome of either knowing the answer and thus choosing correctly or not knowing the answer
and choosing incorrectly. Rather, students may select an answer based on multiple strategies.
Rogers and Bateson (1991) developed a flow-chart model where individuals first attempt to
recall knowledge relevant to the question, with success leading to a direct knowledge-derived
answer and failure leads to the use of various of test-wiseness strategies to help determine the
answer or, at least, help create “educated” guesses by evaluating which alternatives are most
likely to be correct.
In brief, Rogers and Bateson (1991) identified 4 different strategies for answering
multiple choice questions:
1. Using knowledge about the test content to determine the correct answer.
2

2. Guessing blindly if no answer is determined.
3. Using test-wiseness strategies to take advantage of the test and its information, resulting
in a test-wiseness derived answer.
4. Making an “educated guess” if no answer is determined, making use of a reduced number
of possible alternatives.
Guessing
The simplest explanation for choosing a correct answer without knowing it, students may
be able to answer questions simply by choosing one of the alternatives at random. In a standard,
4-alternative test, this means a “chance” score would simply be 25%. Under the assumption that
students possess some level of knowledge on the material and/or some test-wiseness skills, and
that random guessing is unlikely to result in high test performance, students will likely employ
other strategies to improve their odds (Downing, 2003); it is more likely that “blind guessing” is
only done as a last resort. These blind guesses are distinct from “educated guesses,” which
themselves are reliant on other strategies to eliminate false alternatives and gauge which
alternatives are more likely to be correct.
Learning the Material
Fundamentally, the use of a test, regardless of format, is to gauge a test-taker’s
knowledge or ability. In educational contexts, tests are given to measure students’ knowledge
and mastery of specified materials. Material to be learned is presented in the classroom and
associated assignments, and therefore equally available for all students. If exams were calibrated
to accurately measure student learning, a student who has learnt 50% of the material would score
a 50% on an exam.
3

But prior knowledge and test-wiseness can inflate multiple-choice scores. Assuming the
student can correctly identify the correct alternative for 50% of the questions, chance
performance on the remaining 50% would inflate their score to 62.5%. Further correct answers
may be identified by characteristics inherent to the test itself as well as test-taking skills and
extraneous knowledge possessed by students.
Background Knowledge
Another possible attribute that may help in determining an answer is knowledge learned
through outside experience. Knowledge learned through outside experience may help in
determining an answer is correct. General knowledge allows a question to be answered as it is
something that is commonly known or perceived as obvious. While this information may not
always allow test-takers to identify the correct answer, as learning the material might, it may
allow them to recognize incorrect responses, narrowing down the answer choices available. A
student who had not learnt the correct answer in class, but who could use background knowledge
to reduce the number of possible alternatives to only two, would improve their 25% score to 50%
by such elimination.
Test-wiseness
Test-wiseness represents yet another way where students may select the correct answer
without knowing it. Test-wiseness is understood to be the ability of an individual to correctly
answer questions independently of possessing knowledge of the correct answer. This is different
than the previous two strategies, though overlap in their use is likely common. While background
knowledge is also ancillary, test-wiseness focuses on the test and its idiosyncrasies, or on more
general test-independent skills like time management. Test-wiseness is demonstrated at the time
4

of testing, as opposed to learning the material prior to the test. If an individual can discern the
correct answer to a question due to the information present in the test itself, this would be testwiseness.
Test-wiseness can be defined generally as taking advantage of the testing format or
situation (Millman, Bishop, & Ebel, 1965) or more specifically as taking advantage of
unintentional cues in multiple-choice tests (Gibb, 1964) to improve test performance. This skill
is generalizable, meaning that it can be used on tests of varying materials and subjects. However,
some tests may be more susceptible to test-wiseness, either due to their format or the material
being presented, with the latter interacting with background knowledge. Rogers and Bateson
(1991) suggest that the deductive reasoning behind some test-wiseness strategies is dependent on
prior knowledge, and test-takers that possess both test-wiseness and prior knowledge will
perform better than those who possess only one or the other.
Millman, Bishop, and Ebel (1965) present an extensive taxonomy that details testwiseness strategies that may be employed by students. Broadly, these can be grouped into two
categories: test-independent, where the strategies used are not reliant on the structure of the test
or testing situation, and test-dependent, where these factors and testing purpose play a role in
strategy use. In the former category, strategies rely on skills such as time-management or erroravoidance, as well as deductive reasoning, which interacts with the previously mentioned
background knowledge. As an example, a student may realize they do not know the answer to a
difficult question and then decide to set it aside for later and thereby avoid losing valuable time
or rashly choosing an answer at random.
In the test-dependent category, the susceptible characteristics of the testing material plays
a larger role, as idiosyncrasies and cues are examined and exploited in order to determine the
5

correct answer, all without knowing the actual material. A student may choose an answer that is
notably longer or shorter than other alternatives, or an answer that has more detail. If the
participant is familiar with the habits of the test constructor, they may be able to exploit this
knowledge, such as by selecting answers based on specific language. If the constructor includes a
distractor that opposes the correct answer, by including a negative such as “not,” the participant
can effectively remove the other answer choices and answer with a 50/50 likelihood of success.
Another possible strategy is to consider surrounding questions, which may offer detail that
reveals information, such as a question asking for specific information following a general
information question. Similarly, recalling specifically emphasized details or information from the
constructor may not reveal the correct answer, but offer enough information to determine which
items are likely to be correct or incorrect.
Hughes, Salvia, and Bott (1991) found that approximately 75% of tests created by
teachers and those provided by publishers contained cued items. Rogers and Bateson’s (1991)
assessment of school leaving examinations found that 43% to 80% of items were test-wise
susceptible, and that students’ scores with these susceptible items were significantly higher than
those without. The kinds of “educated guesses” brought on by test-wiseness strategies may
dramatically increase scores, even when students do not know the correct answer. Instead they
can determine what the incorrect answers are. While the simple strategy of guessing randomly
would result in an average of 25%, these strategies, especially when coupled with helpful
background knowledge, can drastically inflate scores for test-takers even though they have not
learned the testing material.
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All of the Above
While these strategies are distinct, it is likely that multiple strategies are employed
(Rogers & Bateson, 1991). If the correct answer is not simply known through prior learning, then
students may attempt to use both background knowledge and test-wiseness strategies to help
eliminate incorrect alternatives or determine the likelihood of any alternative to be correct or
incorrect. If a student can then safely assume an alternative is the only correct choice, then that
answer is selected. If multiple alternatives are considered possible, then finally, the student may
make an “educated guess” between the lessened number of alternatives. In a standard fouralternative question, if a student is able to eliminate two alternatives as possible choices, then
these guesses increase in accuracy from a 25% chance to a 50% chance. When averaged across a
number of items in a test, this can result in scores that are significantly higher than a baseline that
only accounts for random guessing.
The Validity of Tests
Ultimately, if the purpose of tests is to measure an individual’s learning of material, then
these extraneous factors decrease the construct validity of tests and hamper their usefulness as
metrics of learning in both academic and research contexts. Whether an individual is learning
from a lecture, a textbook, or a guided laboratory task, the tests that measure their performance
afterwards are subject to internal factors that vary between participants (background knowledge
and test-wiseness) and external factors and characteristics of the test itself (e.g. length, number of
answer choices, difficulty) which may increase its unreliability.
Individual differences on factors such as both test-wiseness and background knowledge
are especially important, as they are inherently unevenly distributed among test-takers.
Background knowledge, as a result of education or life experiences, can play a significant role in
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separating participants’ scores if testing materials contain items that are susceptible. As this
background knowledge would not be the focus of the test itself and would be considered
ancillary, this uneven distribution can become unfair, and can disadvantage some students while
simultaneously benefiting others.
The same can be said for test-wiseness: students who are more skilled at examining the
test’s structure for cues are able to score more highly than those who are less skilled, even with
an equal level of material learnt. Although test-wiseness skills can be taught (Sarnacki, 1979),
we must ask ourselves why we are seeking to teach students to perform well even in the absence
of learning the material. Presumably we are not training students for a lifetime of multiple-choice
tests, but instead educating them with information that will be helpful in their careers and their
lives. Coaching test-wiseness skills runs counter to our efforts to educate students.
An important consideration is the role of the test given, which will depend on the context.
In a formal education environment, instructors may not give much care to where knowledge of
the material tested came from, only that the students are familiar enough with it to demonstrate
mastery of the concepts taught. In situations such as these, background knowledge may not be
considered a detrimental factor for the usefulness of a test. However, separating the factors of
learning, prior knowledge, and test-wiseness may still allow for a better understanding of what
sources individuals rely on for demonstrating understanding of the test material, which will
ultimately provide information beneficial to curricula design and test construction.
Failure to account for these factors may lead to an inaccurate estimate of both what
students have learned and what instructors have taught. While high item discriminability may
allow for comparative judgments between groups of students (e.g. ‘A’ students scored 10%
higher than ‘B’ students), these measures may fail to account for the genuine level of knowledge
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or mastery either at the individual or group level. If a group demonstrates 10% higher scores than
another but has only learnt 30% of the material tested, then this group may be inadvertently
given passing scores due to ancillary factors, while still showing a level of separation between
other groups. Accounting for factors such as background knowledge not only makes examination
fairer between students but can also provide a more accurate absolute measurement, which is
important in establishing that students have genuinely learnt the necessary materials in a course,
and that instructors are effectively teaching said materials.
How Well Can Students Outsmart the Test?
Roberson (2018) examined student performance on publisher’s test-bank questions
before the students had been exposed to the material in lectures or from their textbook.
Participants were presented with test items drawn from two separate test-banks that accompanied
introductory psychology textbooks. Two chapters were selected from each test-bank, covering
abnormal and social psychology. Even and odd questions from these four tests were then
separated into different versions, in order to reduce the number of items which may provide
information and answers by covering similar material. Participants were drawn from General
Psychology classes at Mississippi State University.
The 222 participants were able to select the correct answer 49.97% of the time, nearly
double the chance rate of 25%. In addition, the variability in participant scores was large, ranging
from 29% to 79% (Figure 1). Multiple choice items showed an even greater range, between
approximately 7% to 98% overall (Figure 2): Some items are evidently highly misleading while
others are easy for everyone to guess.
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Figure 1.

Previous Overall Participant Scores.

Frequency of overall participant scores on material from introductory psychology test banks,
Roberson (2018)

Figure 2.

Previous Overall Item Scores.

Frequency of overall item scores on material from introductory psychology test banks, Roberson
(2018)
10

In addition to the substantive questions from the test bank, demographic questions
regarding previous enrollment in the course and prior exposure to the material were also
included. As this experiment continued throughout the full semester, some students reported that
they had encountered the tested material in their General Psychology course, either through
lectures or textbooks. Roberson (2018) found no significant difference in average scores between
individuals who stated that they had encountered the material previously (M = .501, SD = .095)
and those who said they had not (M = .501, SD = .098), p = .990. Even more depressingly,
participants who indicated they had taken the class previously fared significantly worse than
other participants, indicating a lack of transfer from their previous class materials to the
experimental tests.
From these findings, most students are able to score significantly above a chance level,
suggesting the use of test-taking strategies. However, the specific strategies employed are
unknown. Students could have employed test-wiseness, background knowledge, or some
combination of the two. While these findings suggest that commercially available test-banks may
be susceptible to test-taking strategies, the individual strategies’ rates of use and effectiveness are
still undetermined and require further investigation.
Roberson (2018) also found that items varied drastically in their indices of
discriminability. Item discriminability measures the ability for a student’s overall performance to
be gauged by whether they correctly answer each specific item. Classroom exams are
presumably measuring how much of the course content students have learned, and item
discriminability measures how well each question can distinguish knowledgeable students from
students with poorer mastery of the material. Items with high positive discriminability are
indicators of good performance overall, while the items with negative discriminability indicate
11

that those participants who answered correctly instead had poor overall performance on the test.
Participants in Roberson’s study had not been exposed to material in class. In this case,
participants who did ‘well’ on the exam presumably had more informal background knowledge,
better test-wiseness skills than lower-performing participants, or both, rather than more formal
knowledge on the test topics.
This consideration lead to the current study’s examination of both highly positive and
highly negative discriminability items. Rather than positive, high discriminability items being
synonymous with high quality, these items may be just as susceptible to test-wiseness strategies
or contain as many salient cues for test-takers as other items. If this is the case, then high
discriminability may not be an effective metric by which to judge test items’ usefulness in
measuring student knowledge when constructing examinations, as those who do well overall
may simply be more test-wise than their peers.
Items with negative discriminability are also an important consideration. If these items
are answered correctly by students with overall poor performance, they may possess
characteristics that make them much more difficult for otherwise well-performing participants.
Attributes such as confusingly worded question stems or misleading alternatives may cause
participants attempting to make knowledge-based answers fail, as well as disrupt test-wiseness
strategy use. By observing performance on these negative discriminability items, it may be
possible to see whether participant strategy shifts in response to the item’s characteristics, and
how effective that might be.
Examinations of test banks’ quality often involves experts who attempt to identify
vulnerabilities which may allow test-wiseness strategies to succeed (Tarrant et al., 2006; Hansen
& Dexter, 1997; Downing, 2002). While these examinations are often capable of noting flaws in
12

the test, such as misleading items, they often do not account for the background knowledge of
the test-takers themselves, which can play a large role in their ability to identify correct and
incorrect alternatives. Therefore, the necessary method for examining this ability must be able to
independently assess both background knowledge and test-wiseness skills as contributing factors
in test performance.
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CHAPTER II
EXPERIMENT ONE
This research is designed to answer two research questions. The first: “To what extent do
prior knowledge and test-wiseness facilitate selecting correct answers on commercial multiplechoice introductory psychology test banks?” The second: “How do students differ in their ability
to employ these strategies to improve their performance on exams?”
To separately assess prior knowledge and test-wiseness, test items can be presented in
formats which promote or prohibit the use of one or the other. For prior knowledge, items can be
presented with only a single alternative, limiting the availability of cues due to multiple
alternatives or viewing other questions. This allows for prior knowledge of the material to be
demonstrated through positive confidence judgments on correct alternatives and negative
confidence judgments on incorrect alternatives. Conversely, test-wiseness is demonstrated
through correctly answering questions only when presented with multiple alternatives at once.
By presenting the questions in both a single-alternative format, which limits available
cues, and a traditional multiple-choice format, the extent of test-wiseness may be examined in a
paradigm that only requires recognition, not recall. Prior knowledge can be demonstrated even
when participants are presented with only a single-alternative for the question, while the
availability of cues in a standard, multiple-choice format allows test-wiseness to be employed.
To answer how participants differ from one another in their background knowledge and
their ability to use test-wiseness, we can examine the distribution of scores attributable to
14

differences in their prior knowledge and their test-wiseness. A positive relationship between
scores on both tasks would indicate that participants who knew the answer were able to identify
the correct choice in both formats, using prior knowledge, while no relationship would point to
the multiple-choice cues as necessary for determining a correct answer.
Method
Participants
College undergraduates currently enrolled in an introductory psychology course
participated in the experiment in exchange for research credit. A total of 183 students
participated, with 8 students’ data being removed either due to technical errors or failure to
complete the tasks, resulting in 175 participants’ data being used in the analysis.
Materials
Thirty questions covering a variety of abnormal and social psychology concepts were
used in this experiment. These questions were sourced from test-bank creation software that
accompanied two introductory psychology textbooks and were used in previous research
(Roberson, 2018.) The 30 items selected were chosen by their discriminability index from the
previous research and sorted into two groups: high positive discriminability versus high negative
discriminability. An additional question (“What color is an orange?”) was included as a
manipulation check to discern if participants were on-task. Each of these questions was
accompanied by four alternatives: three foils and the correct answer. Note that the set of test
questions was developed to minimize cross-talk between items: it was not possible to glean the
answer to any given question from material in the remainder of the questions.
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This experiment was presented digitally using PsychoPy software (Peirce et al., 2019).
All instructions, questions, alternatives, and graphs were presented using a black font on a white
background for contrast and legibility.
Procedure
Participants are first presented with instructions and practice problems to familiarize
them with the two phases of the experiment. Throughout the experiment, participants are shown
question stems alongside either a single alternative or multiple alternatives. In the singlealternative task, only one alternative is shown at a time, with the program cycling through all
questions in a random order before the next cycle with the next set of alternatives (“A”
alternatives, then “B”, and so on.) In the multiple-choice task, questions are presented in a
random order, but all possible alternatives are shown simultaneously. Following each question,
participants are asked to identify what sources of information they used to either rate the
alternative’s correctness in the single-alternative task or to select the correct alternative out of the
four available in the multiple-choice task (Figure 3).

Figure 3.

List of Possible Sources.

Possible sources participants can select following the questions in both the single-alternative and
multiple-choice task. Multiple sources may be selected.

16

Participants are first presented with a question and a single alternative for that question
and asked to rate whether said alternative is correct or incorrect on a five-point scale. They then
list any and all sources of information used to arrive at that rating, before moving onto the next
question. After all 30 questions have been used, this process repeated using the next set of
alternatives, until all four alternatives for all questions had been presented (Figure 4).
A five-point Likert scale was used by participants to rate confidence in whether a
displayed alternative was correct or incorrect in the single-alternative condition. This scale
ranged from -2 (Absolutely incorrect) to +2 (Absolutely correct) with 0 as a neutral “Unsure.” A
graphic rating scale was used to measure participants’ confidence that their answer was correct
following each question in the multiple-choice condition. This scale ranged from 1 (not at all
confident) to 100 (completely confident). A list of six possible sources of information (Figure 3)
was also presented following these scales. Participants made all selections by using the mouse.
Due to an error in the experiment code, source selections for “general knowledge”
erroneously marked “Answer seemed like a good match for the question” as being selected as
well in the output files, while marking the latter did not provide any output. This did not affect
the display during the experiment. Selection of “seemed” was therefore calculated from vectors
where no source was selected, as participants were required to mark at least one source during
each attribution. Participants had the option of checking multiple sources; any time they selected
“seemed” along with another source was not properly recorded.

17

Figure 4.

Sequence of Tasks in Experiment One

Following the single-alternative phase, participants were then presented with the
questions in the traditional four-alternative multiple-choice format and asked to select the correct
answer. Next, the participants rated their confidence in their answer using a continuous graphic
rating scale (1 – 100), and finally identify the source or sources they used. This process repeated
for all 30 questions, and then the experiment ended with the participants being debriefed.
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CHAPTER III
RESULTS
To our knowledge, the measurements we are collecting have not been employed
previously and little is known about their properties. We need to first evaluate some basic
characteristics of these measures. By establishing criteria such as variability between items and
participants, further inferential analyses can be made with the knowledge that the resulting
statistics are due to the manipulations of the experiment.
Firstly, looking at the variability across items, a large distribution of scores was evident.
Figure 5 shows a frequency histogram of the accuracy for the 30 questions on the multiplechoice task, with a range of 16% to 83% and mean score of 40.79%. Of note is the number of
scores falling in the 30%-40% range, which is a rate achievable through guessing after removing
one false alternative (33%).

19

Figure 5.

Frequency Histogram of Multiple-Choice Item Accuracy.

Secondly, there is the distribution of participants’ scores on the multiple-choice task.
These scores also show overall accuracy exceeds the 25% chance rate. Participants show a broad
range of accuracy similar to our previous research, with some participants scoring well into 60%
while others fall below the chance level (Figure 6).
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Figure 6.

Frequency Histogram of Multiple-Choice Participant Accuracy

Independence of Single-Alternative Confidence Judgments
Even though the question stems were presented in randomized order within each block of
the single-alternative phase, the alternatives for each question were presented in a fixed order (all
A alternatives, then all B alternatives, and so on). Accordingly, there is the possibility that the
ratings made on early alternatives could influence the confidence judgments of latter alternatives
for that question. For example, recognizing the correct answer was A in the first block logically
implies all later selections for the same question are wrong. In such an example where
independence is violated, participants who mark A with a +2 rating are predicted to mark the
following alternatives with -2 or -1, even though they might have been uncertain about those
alternatives if they had been seen earlier. Conversely, participants who marked the first three
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alternatives as incorrect would be much more likely to mark the final alternative with +1 or +2,
as it is the only option not rejected.
In order to evaluate whether the responses made during the four single-alternative blocks
were independent, early ratings were used to predict later ratings. The confidence judgments on
C were regressed against the judgments on A and B, while the confidence judgments on D were
regressed against the judgments on A, B, and C.
However, these regressions did not reflect the judgments in their presented order. Instead,
the maximum and minimum ratings were found for each item and those values were used to
predict the rating. This was done in order to use the most confident ratings on each item in terms
of both the “most correct” rated alternative and the “least correct” rated alternative. A participant
who marked A as +2 and B as -2 would, in a non-independent scenario, but predicted to mark C
as -2 as well. The same idea applies for a participant who marked A, B, and C as -2, with D
being expected to be +2. The use of these minimum and maximum ratings allows for the
correlations between the predictors and predicted rating to be either 1 or -1, depending on the
participant’s trend of answering across the predictor alternatives.
The very small amount of variance explained by the ratings of previous alternatives on
latter alternatives (Alternative C: adjusted R2 = .008; Alternative D: adjusted R2 = .034) strongly
suggests that later single-alternative confidence judgments are largely independent of earlier
judgments, with only the very large number of observations used (N = 5250) responsible for both
regressions’ statistical significance (p <. 001). When predicting C, the minimum (B = .094, β =
.087) had a stronger relationship than the maximum (B = .016, β = .013), with the same shown
for D, but the minimum (B = 0.209, β = .177) and maximum (B = -.116, β = -.084) predicting
opposite directions. This is expected, because if participants were able to answer correctly by
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being exposed to the correct alternative early and thus have their following ratings influenced,
we would see maximum ratings (the ratings of 2) having a much larger predictive power than the
minimum ratings. The range of participants’ ratings on alternatives (Figure 7) features a wide
spread of answers across the predictive ratings1.

Figure 7.

Single-Alternative Confidence Judgment Ratings

Participants’ overall ratings for correct (orange) and incorrect (gray) alternatives in the singlealternative task.

Additionally, a uniform multinomial distribution of scores on the SACJs was computed
to further examine participants’ ratings and confirm that they were not affected by the ordering
of the alternatives (e.g. giving a +2 rating to the first alternative and then -2 to all subsequent

1

As a rating of zero is “Unsure”, it does not help predict future ratings by indicating the participant knows
something about the correct/incorrect answers. Therefore, cases where the participant is unsure and answers with
zeros may be removed from the regression, with the remaining cases being only those with possible predictions from
participants. However, these new regressions for C (N = 3235, adjusted R2 = .011) and D (N = 2709, adjusted R2 =
.041) show little improvement over the standard regressions.
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alternatives). These ratings were created by summing up the total confidence ratings on each
alternative of an item, reversing the scores for the incorrect alternatives (-2 would become a +2,
and so on.) Comparing them to the experimental results (Figure 8), only minor deviations are
shown. This demonstrates that, rather than a significantly larger proportion of higher scores due
to early identification of the correct alternative, the data are close to the model of complete
independence of ratings.

Figure 8.

Comparison of Frequency of SACJ Scores

This figure compares participants’ single-alternative confidence judgments (orange) to a uniform
multinomial distribution (blue).
Single-Alternative Confidence Judgments – Effects of Item and Participant Characteristics
Immediately following each single-alternative confidence judgment, participants were
asked to make a corresponding single-alternative source attribution (SASA). Participants were
asked to select any and all sources of information they used when answering the SACJs (Figure
3). Through analyzing the rates of selection for these sources, we may identify uses of previous
24

knowledge or test-wiseness strategies and how participants’ sources change as a result of
differences in item characteristics, such as discriminability.
With six choices for attribution, a vector can be created, and the participant’s choices
across the four alternatives can be summed together. As an example, a participant who indicated
that they had learnt the material in class for all four alternatives would have a vector with 4 for
that source and 0 for the other sources. Four is the maximum value possible for a source in the
vector and zero is the minimum. A participant who was inconsistent in their selection may select
a different source for each alternative, resulting in a vector where four sources have a value of 1,
as no source is selected more than once.
For the SASAs, a series of four analyses were performed on these vectors, which
compared the frequency of source attributions as they may be affected by other variables
including items, participant accuracy, discriminability index, and item correctness. If differences
are shown in source attributions, this suggests that the source of data is useful in understanding
performance on the task. In a degenerate case, everyone might universally report ‘Don’t
know/had to guess’ on all items, in which case the data will not be useful in later analyses.
The first independent variable examined are the items and how they affect the sources
participants select. As predicted, there was a significance difference between the sources used
based on the item presented, χ2(145) = 9042.9, p < .001. This suggests the data is useful in efforts
to relate source judgments and performance.
The second analysis examined differences of sources between correct and incorrect
alternatives. Looking at the table of observed source attributions (Table 1), “guess” is cited as the
source much more frequently than others, for both correct and incorrect alternatives. The
percentage selecting ‘guess’ for incorrect answers, however, is greater than for correct.
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Participants may struggle to cite a specific source of information when stating an alternative is
false but be more specific when they are affirming that an alternative is correct.
Table 1
Single-Alternative Source Judgments by (In)Correct Alternatives in Percentage
Class

Textbook

Personal

General

Guess

Seemed

11.82

5.00

6.92

14.93

42.69

18.63

14.00

6.99

8.97

16.40

35.60

18.04

Incorrect
Alternatives
Correct
Alternatives

The third analysis compared the frequencies of sources used between the two item
discriminability groups (positive and negative item discriminability). Based on the table of
observed results (Table 2), the largest difference appears to be an increase in guessing for
negative discriminability items, while positive discriminability items have more attributions to
general knowledge or test-wiseness (“The answer seems to be a good match for the question.”)
This result matches the prediction that high discriminability items either require prior knowledge
of the material to select the correct answer (hence the increased number of citations for prior
knowledge, like “class”) or higher test-wiseness in order to determine the answer (higher
“seemed” rate). Meanwhile, negative discriminability items are poor predictors of overall
performance, likely by obfuscating the correct answer with difficult to parse questions or
particularly misleading distractor alternatives.
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Table 2
Single-Alternative Source Judgments by Discriminability Group in Percentages
Class

Textbook

Personal

General

Guess

Seemed

6.78

2.92

3.51

8.51

18.15

10.16

5.60

2.60

3.94

6.80

22.71

8.33

Positive
Discriminability
Negative
Discriminability

The fourth analysis compared source attributions between high-scoring and low-scoring
participants, using their scores on the single-alternative task. The participants were split into four
ability groups by quartiles, with Quartile 4 being the highest scoring group. Looking at the table
of observed results (Table 3), it appears that the sources used by participants had large
differences in their rates of use, with guessing accounting for approximately 40% of sources
listed. In comparison, participants cited using information learnt from a class or textbook much
less frequently than guessing or stating that the answer chosen “seemed” correct, indicating a
test-wise judgment. Surprisingly, the rates of selection for these sources did not differ greatly
across the quartiles. With “guess” and “seemed” being the most often selected sources, this
suggests that accurately rating an alternative as correct or incorrect is dependent on the
participant’s ability to make well-reasoned “educated guesses,” rather than their ability to recall
previously learnt information from other sources.
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Table 3
Single-Alternative Source Judgments by Participant Scores (Quartiles) in Percentages
Class

Textbook

Personal

General

Guess

Seemed

Quartile 1

13.59

5.31

6.49

14.12

41.70

18.78

Quartile 2

9.33

5.93

6.50

13.24

43.20

21.80

Quartile 3

11.58

4.74

8.64

16.72

42.04

16.28

Quartile 4

14.99

6.08

8.12

17.07

36.58

17.15

In total, these analyses highlight differences across the aggregate source attributions,
helping to further define the item and participant characteristics that lead to selection of
particular sources.
Multiple-Choice Accuracy
Accuracy on multiple-choice questions is binary, either correct or incorrect, in contrast to
the SACJs scale of possible scores. Participants were presented with a question, along with its
four possible alternatives, and asked to select the correct answer (Figure 9). Correctness on
multiple choice questions was analyzed using a gamma correlation with the discriminability
index predicting accuracy, grouped by participant. These participant gammas were then used in a
one-sample t-test to compare them with a baseline of 0, to determine if there was a significant
effect of item discriminability on participant accuracy.
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Figure 9.

Example of Multiple-Choice Question and Alternatives

There was a significant difference found between the baseline of 0 and the participants’
gamma correlations (M = .261) between their accuracy and the items’ discriminability, t(174) =
14.352, p < .001. Based on the average positive value of the gamma correlations, the overall
accuracy for items is higher for the positive discriminability items than the negative
discriminability items. This provides support for the idea that high-discriminability is, of course,
a good metric for predicting overall performance on the test, but that it is not (considering the
unfamiliarity of the material to participants and their sources used) a metric which guarantees
those who succeed do so through having learnt the test material.
Multiple-Choice Source Attributions – Effects of Item and Participant Characteristics
There are also the multiple-choice source attributions (MCSAs) given after the
participant selects an alternative and provides their confidence rating, identical to those used in
the SASAs (Figure 3). These are not aggregated across item alternatives as they were for the
single-alternative task, as this phase of the experiment has each item only appearing once.
The first analysis compared the frequencies of source attributions based on the items. The
source attributions given were significantly different across the items presented to participants,
χ2(145) = 2656.8, p < .001.
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The second analysis examined the two item discriminability groups (positive and
negative discriminability). Looking at the table of observed results (Table 4), it appears that
positive-discriminability items have higher rates of classes or textbooks being cited as a source,
but also general knowledge and test-wiseness. The greater use of both prior knowledge and testwiseness is expected, while the increase in proportion for test-wiseness for this task over the
single-alternative task (Table 2), points to the increased availability of cues due to the multiplechoice format resulting in greater test-wiseness use, if not efficacy.
Table 4
Multiple-Choice Source Judgments by Discriminability Groups in Percentages

Positive

Class

Textbook

Personal

General

Guess

Seemed

7.67

3.34

4.08

8.60

17.09

9.36

5.72

2.71

4.84

6.45

22.83

7.30

Discriminability
Negative
Discriminability

The third analysis examined participants divided into quartile groups based on
participants’ overall accuracy on the multiple-choice questions. With the table of observations
(Table 5), it seems that the lowest performers (Quartile 1) are less likely to indicate learning the
information from class or personal experience than the highest performers (Quartile 4).
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Table 5
Multiple-Choice Source Judgments by Participant Accuracy (Quartiles)
Class

Textbook

Personal

General

Guess

Seemed

Quartile 1

10.72

6.66

7.03

15.61

40.35

19.63

Quartile 2

15.31

4.82

7.64

13.14

43.69

15.39

Quartile 3

13.97

6.49

10.67

15.39

38.60

14.89

Quartile 4

13.46

6.19

10.20

16.08

37.12

16.95

These analyses not only highlight the levels of consistency in alternative selection and
how they are affected by these participant and item characteristics, but also provide additional
information on how test-wiseness can improve participants’ ability to correctly answer questions,
even with minor changes such as presentation of multiple alternatives.
Given that the internal consistency of our measures has been established, we can begin
answering the primary research questions regarding test quality and student performance. These
questions examine: 1) the extent to which students exploit test-wiseness and prior knowledge, 2)
whether high-performing students have greater meta-awareness of their performance, and 3) how
item discriminability affects confidence of students of different performance levels.
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CHAPTER IV
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Question 1 – “To What Extent Do Students Exploit Test-Wiseness and Prior Knowledge to
Answer Questions?”
In this experiment, participants were subjectively judged to be using test-wiseness to
answer multiple-choice questions based on their source attributions. While participants can state
that they used multiple sources to answer a question, test-wiseness use was defined by two
criteria: they do not select a source indicating previously learning the material (e.g. “I learnt this
from a textbook.”) and they do select the alternative chosen “seems to match the question.”
These source attributions help to sort participants’ answers into groups: 1) Retrieving prior
knowledge from outside of academia (citing personal experience or general knowledge); 2)
Learning through formal education (citing classes or textbooks); 3) Employing test-wiseness
(defined above); and 4) Random guessing (citing having to guess).
The 6 original source attributions were collapsed into the four categories above. One
important consideration for the following analyses is the exclusivity of these categories.
Participants may, for any question, select multiple sources as being used to provide an answer.
Having multiple categories being listed for a single question, however, dilutes their
independence and may cause further issues regarding the assumptions necessary for the analyses.
Therefore, it is important to examine just how often multiple sources were selected, and how
these multiple selections are distributed.
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Of the 5225 total responses for the multiple-choice task, 89% had participants indicate
only one source was used, with 9% having two, and the remaining 2% having three to five. For
the questions where two sources were cited, most were within categories (e.g. class and textbook
or general knowledge and personal experience) and could be combined without issue. In total,
95.87% of the total source attributions for the multiple-choice task were category exclusive. As
the remaining 4.13% are spread across multiple conflicting categories, they have been discarded
for the remaining analyses.
When looking at the table of observed attributions for correct and incorrect answers
(Table 6), the largest difference observed is the high frequency of guessing for incorrect answers.
Participants who reported they were guessing had a high probability of having selected the
wrong answer. Curiously, students who did report exposure to the material in a formal learning
setting, and thus presumably ‘knew’ the correct answer, had no better chance of selecting the
correct answer than students who employed background knowledge or test-wiseness cue.
Table 6
Multiple-Choice Source Judgment Groups by (In)Correct Answers
Formal

Informal

Guess

Test-

Knowledge

Knowledge

Incorrect Answers

378

514

1497

577

Correct Answers

360

511

709

407

wiseness

It is also possible to approximate the proportion of prior knowledge used in the SACJs
through observing the difference between chance performance (25%) and their overall
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performance. This overall performance is calculated using the participants’ ratings for the correct
and incorrect alternatives of an item (Figure 7). As these ratings are not just a binary choice, a
“knowledge-based recall” for an item can be operationalized in multiple ways. As this task’s role
is to highlight the role of prior knowledge by eliminating test-wiseness, the operationalization
should be focused on showing participant performance due to only recalling previously learnt
information, rather than using test-wiseness cues or strategies, such as comparing the alternatives
against one another.
The simplest way to rate an item as correctly answered would be to compute a synthetic
recognition score by comparing the rating for the correct alternative against all of the incorrect
alternatives. If the correct alternative receives a higher rating than all incorrect items, we judge
they successfully selected the correct answer. Those who provide equal maximum ratings for
correct and one or more incorrect alternatives would be considered to have answered correctly
half the time, while those who rate the incorrect alternative as more likely to be correct than the
actual correct answered would be considered to have missed the question. Using this method for
all participants and their items, we obtained an average score of 42.2% for participants.
However, as this method of scoring does not factor in the correct rejection of false
alternatives, it may inflate participants’ scores in the single-alternative task. Participants may rate
both the correct and incorrect alternatives as “Likely Correct,” leading to an overall answer that
is more likely an educated guess based on test-wiseness than a definitive recall of prior
knowledge. While choosing the alternative that is “most correct” is a valid option during testtaking for narrowing down answer choices, correctly recalling previously learnt information is
expected to not only inform participants of what the right answer is, but to more definitively
provide information to discard false alternatives.
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Participants who used prior knowledge to correctly answer the questions in the singlealternative task were expected to answer the same questions correctly in the multiple-choice task.
This is due to their use of recalled information, rather than the use of internal cues which
facilitate test-wiseness strategies. However, using the aforementioned method of comparing the
highest rating for correct and incorrect alternatives, participants had an average score on the
traditional multiple-choice format of only 36.24% on those items judged to be ‘correct’ using the
synthetic score based on SACJ’s. Therefore, the average SACJ score of 42.2% appears to
overstate how many items participants were able to recall on their combined confidence
judgments.
A more selective method for rating participants’ responses is to define a correct response
for an item that has a positive confidence for the correct alternative (1 or 2) and a less-than-one
judgment (-2, -1, 0) for all incorrect alternatives. This method treats the rating of “Likely
Correct” or “Absolutely Correct” for the correct alternative as equivalent to their selection in a
multiple-choice context, with neutral or negative ratings for the incorrect alternatives as correct
rejections. In summary, this would demonstrate prior knowledge use to answer these questions,
as the participants are able to clearly separate the correct alternative from the incorrect ones.
With this operationalization, participants had a 13.1% recall rate overall, a much lower
rate than suggested by the lenient scoring method. However, this did demonstrate a much higher
rate of accuracy for the multiple-choice items which they had answered correctly in the singlealternative phase. Participants’ average score on these items was 69.81%, suggesting these
stricter results are likely demonstrating the contribution of prior knowledge on both tasks.
If we further insist on a rating of 2, the maximum rating of “Absolutely Correct”, for the
correct alternative and retain the same range (-2, -1, 0) for incorrect alternatives, the synthetic
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recall rate for the single-alternative task is only 4.3%. Finally, if we define a correct recall as a
(1, 2) for correct and (-2, -1) for all incorrect alternatives, meaning that no alternative is rated
with “Unsure,” recall is 6.7%.
Overall, participants demonstrated the ability to identify what alternative is “most likely”
(rating the correct alternative above the incorrect alternatives) at a rate 17.2% above a chance
25% rate of randomly selecting one alternative as the most correct. This rate is similar to what
has been shown previously in regards to participants’ ability to select answers through “educated
guesses” on multiple-choice questions (Roberson, 2018). This suggests that participants may be
able to employ test-wiseness strategies, even with only a question stem and alternative, in order
to gauge alternatives’ relative likelihood of being correct. However, participants were much less
able to both identify the correct alternative for a single-item and reject the incorrect alternatives,
leading to prior-knowledge-based recall rates of no greater than 13.1%.
Next, we can compare this derived accuracy measure against the final performance on the
complete multiple-choice items. The average of participants’ scores on the multiple-choice task
was 40.75%. Subtracting a baseline 25% achievable through randomly guessing, the average
multiple-choice score is 15.75%, a higher rate of performance than the 13.1% rate estimated by
the derived single-alternative method. This increase over baseline guessing was expected, as we
anticipated that availability of test-wiseness cues in the full multiple-choice items would enable
participants to more frequently identify the correct alternative and eliminate other alternatives.
However, it is important to consider the role of prior knowledge responses on the
multiple-choice task, as well. Participants still showed an approximate 70% accuracy for
multiple-choice items that they answered correctly using the stringent scoring method on the
single-alternative task. Therefore, the most conservative estimate of the role of test-wiseness on
36

the MC would consider only those items that participants failed to answer correctly in the singlealternative task, based on the idea that these items are not being answered by prior knowledge
and must be correctly answered using only the available test-wiseness cues. When looking at
participant accuracy for only these items, with subtraction of 25% to account for random
guessing, overall accuracy on the multiple-choice task was 11.40%. In other words, participants
who did not demonstrate prior knowledge of the test material that allowed them to identify the
correct answer to a question were not just randomly guessing for answers, but used the available
information in the items to increase their score by 11.40% overall.
Question 2 – “How Do Students Differ in Their Ability to Employ These Strategies to
Improve Their Performance on Exams?”
Six possible sources can be identified for each item, but these can be collapsed into four
distinct factors: formal learning, general knowledge, test-wiseness, and guessing. We can use
these factors to see which (if any) predict overall test performance. A multiple regression was
performed that predicts overall score in the multiple-choice task for each individual as a function
of their source selections (number of formal selections, number of general knowledge selections,
number of test-wiseness selections, and the number of guess selections). An obvious hypothesis:
performance will be facilitated by general knowledge and test-wiseness, while guessing should
produce lower levels of performance. Formal learning should also be associated with high levels
of performance, though this was a less frequent choice in the data.
This regression failed to demonstrate any of these factors were significant predictors, F(4,
170) = .156, p = .960, with each source providing little explanation of the variance (Table 7).
Thus, students who reported frequently guessing did not perform any worse than students who
reported using formal knowledge to answer a larger share of questions.
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Table 7
Coefficients of Accuracy and Sources Multiple Regression
Formal
Knowledge
Informal
Knowledge
Guess
Test-wiseness

B
.013

β
.018

t
.117

p
.907

.040

.057

.389

.698

-.005
.007

-.010
.012

-.052
.074

.958
.941

This result is surprising and disconcerting. Participants’ success on these multiple-choice
test questions are certainly higher than what would be expected through random guessing, but
there is no obvious separation for those who reported knowing more and those who reported
guessing or using test-wiseness. This suggests that participants have difficulty accurately
reporting the source of their knowledge. A possibility is that this analysis, which looks across all
items, may be failing to discern differences which arise from item discriminability, which was
previously shown to significantly affect which sources are used.
Question 2a – “For Positive- and Negative-Discriminability Items, How Confident Are
Students of Different Levels About Their Performance?”
Building off of the previous question, a second analysis examined the differences in testwiseness and prior knowledge demands of questions based on discriminability. Items with
positive discriminability may be easily answered with the prerequisite prior knowledge or
present their question and alternatives in a way that provides information to test-wise
participants. In contrast, items with negative discriminability indicate poor overall test
performance when answering them correctly. Such items may use misleading distractors as
alternatives or promote misuse of effective test-wiseness strategies. They may also have lessened
predictive power by presenting easily dismissed alternatives which any test-taker can identify as
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incorrect, regardless of their knowledge over the material or overall test-wiseness. We predict
that the characteristics and strategy demands of the items are related to their overall
discriminability, and that this discriminability can significantly affect the confidence and ability
of participants to answer correctly.
A linear mixed-effects model was used to predict participant’s multiple-choice
confidence ratings as a result of the interaction between their accuracy and the item’s
discriminability as a fixed effect, with accuracy also being implemented as random effects
grouped by participant and item, in order to account for inter-factor variability caused by
repeated measurements for the items and participants. The summary of the fixed effects is shown
in table 8.
Table 8
LMEM Fixed Effects for Multiple-Choice Confidence
Estimate (confidence)
54.77
4.86
6.71
6.60

SE
2.64
1.63
5.37
3.49

df
36.17
28.74
28.25
27.75

t
p
20.72 < .001
2.99
.006
1.25
.222
1.89
.069

(Intercept)
Accuracy
Discriminability
Accuracy:
Discriminability
Multiple-choice confidence predicted with accuracy, discriminability, and their interaction as
fixed effects, and accuracy group by participant and item as random effects. Data were analyzed
using R through the lmerTest package (Kuznetsova et al., 2016)
Accuracy is shown to be a significant predictor of confidence in the model. However,
comparing this model to a null model, a marginal R2 of .046 shows little variance in confidence
explained by participant accuracy and item discriminability. While item discriminability has
been shown previously to affect the sources participants say they used to answer, participants
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may not be sure enough in their answers to always report high confidence on their accurate
answers or on high discriminability items they may know the answer to.
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
A new paradigm was developed to explore the sources of knowledge used by
undergraduates to select the correct answer for multiple-choice questions in introductory
psychology. This method contrasts recognition judgments based on the question stem and a
single alternative with traditional multiple-choice recognition judgments. Supplemental data was
obtained by asking participants to indicate, item-by-item, the source of their knowledge.
With a simple method of operationalizing the single-alternative judgments based on the
rating for the correct alternative, we found that participants had a rate of correct response of
42.2%, 17% above chance-level. However, this method fails to definitively separate ratings for
alternatives into a recognition of the correct alternative and rejection of the incorrect alternatives.
Using a stricter operationalization, with correct answers being positive ratings (1 or 2) for the
correct alternative and negative/unsure ratings (0, -1, -2) for all incorrect alternatives, the
participants had a correct response rate of 13.1%. In contrast, performance on the traditional
multiple-choice format, subtracting a base-rate of 25%, was higher, at 15.75%, with a
conservative estimate which accounts for prior knowledge-based answers showing a similar
increase of 11.40%.
Rather than more definitive identification of what answer choices are right and which are
wrong, student success may rely heavily on systematic removal of unlikely alternatives through
the use of test-wiseness cues, including the alternatives themselves. Typical classroom tests may
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additionally inflate student performance by choosing questions that tap into general knowledge
or that offer clues in one question that may help to answer another. Considerable variability was
observed both in item difficulty and in prior knowledge. These findings suggest that student
performance in a classroom may reflect general prior knowledge and test-wiseness more heavily
than classroom learning and recall of that information on tests.
Source judgments showed little predictive ability in accuracy, other than when
participants reported they guessed at the answer and tended to pick the wrong alternative at a
higher frequency than when employing formal knowledge, general background knowledge, or
test-wiseness. The lack of any advantage for having reported that participants learned the
material in a classroom or in a textbook implies students are not learning the material wellenough to select the correct answer more than 42% of the time, a disturbing outcome consistent
with prior research (Roberson, 2018).
The items presented to the participants varied in terms of their discriminability. Positivediscriminability items led to more attributions to prior knowledge and test-wiseness, with
negative-discriminability items having more guesses. Guessing in the former may be considered
“last-resort” guessing, whereas, after a failure to recall the correct information necessary to
determine the correct answer, participants select an alternative without being sure in their choice,
but after performing alternative elimination based on information available to them. Conversely,
participants who state they guess on the negative-discriminability items are likely performing
“first-resort” guessing, where they are selecting an item without necessarily citing anything more
complicated than a random guess. This also explains the predictive power of the item
discriminability on participant’s confidence, where participants who guess on questions
immediately viewing it as a deliberate selection, though without a definitive explanation, while
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those who guess as after being unable to recall view it as a failure to retrieve information, while
test-wiseness may have aided their odds of selecting the right answers. This also matches the
gamma correlation between accuracy and discriminability, which showed a significant difference
in participants’ accuracy on this characteristic.
Hierarchical clustering of the items based on the participants’ reported source judgments
for the multiple-choice task, along with the rate of accuracy for the items, reveals some division
which may relate to the overall difficulty of the items or the efficacy of the first/last-resort
strategies that participants used (Figure 10). Given the relatively small amount of variance
accounted for, however, there are likely other factors responsible as well.

Figure 10.

Hierarchical Clustering of Items

Hierarchical clustering of items' rates of accuracy and source judgments used. Some division
exists, pointing towards specific item characteristics which separate them.
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One explanation is the inability of participants to differentiate between a random guess
and the use of test-wiseness in making source judgments. The wording of the test-wiseness
source (“Answer seemed like a good match for the question”) may be approaching the
participants’ method of answering from the wrong direction (e.g., “Answer seemed like a bad
match for the question”). Rather than selecting a single alternative and stating that it is correct,
and thus selecting this source, participants likely work towards evaluation of all of the
alternatives, removing those that they feel are likely to be incorrect. In this sense, participants are
working off of an estimation of probability, and would be more likely to say that they guessed
through an arbitrary choice, rather than a definitive selection of what they whole-heartedly
believe to be true.
When moving to the multiple-choice task, however, the regression showed that none of
the factors served as significant predictors of participant performance. Hierarchical analysis of
the participants’ accuracies and sources used in the multiple-choice task show no systematicity,
with no clear division of the clusters of participants (Figure 11). With additional cues and
information being presented to participants due to the format, how can this lack of prediction be
explained?
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Figure 11.

Hierarchical Clustering of Participants

Hierarchical clustering of participants’ four source attributions and their accuracy on the
multiple-choice task. The lack of systematic divisions reflects the lack of predictive power of the
four sources and overall scores.

One stated reason is that the differing strategies of the items based on their
discriminability leads to no single factor able to predict success across both groups. While formal
knowledge may help predict success on some items, its use may be limited by participants’
strategies shifting to alternative elimination when prior knowledge is not able to be recalled.
Another explanation, describing the lack of predictive power for test-wiseness: upon recognizing
the question in the multiple-choice task, participants default to selecting the same answer and
source that they used for the previous task, especially if they believe it to be the correct answer,
and thus do not use any test-wiseness strategy before answering.
In summary, participants have once again shown an aptitude for answering questions
over material that they had presumably never encountered. Even when stating that they had
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learnt this material previously, both in formal and informal contexts, their performance showed
little difference to those who stated that they merely guessed. These guesses, however, cannot be
assumed to be strictly random choices. While self-reports of prior knowledge and test-wiseness
were not shown to be significant predictors of test-performance, they must play some role in the
ability of participants to perform well on tests, even if participants cannot precisely identify how
they have done so. In future research, the key to understanding how these factors truly affect test
performance may be further separation of these two sources of information, along with greater
identification of which strategy or source participants are using on a per-question basis, possibly
through the use of a cognitive architecture to emulate students’ test-taking.
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